Is every truth knowable? Reply to Williamson

Ratio 14 (3):263–280 (2001)
Abstract
This paper addresses an objection raised by Timothy Williamson to the ‘restriction strategy’ that I proposed, in The Taming of The True, in order to deal with the Fitch paradox. Williamson provides a new version of a Fitch-style argument that purports to show that even the restricted principle of knowability suffers the same fate as the unrestricted one. I show here that the new argument is fallacious. The source of the fallacy is a misunderstanding of the condition used in stating the restricted knowability principle. I also rebut Williamson’s criticism of my argument for the claim that any proposition of the form ‘it is known that ϕ’ is decidable if ϕ is decidable.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00162
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,692
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.
Fitch's Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149 - 182.
Williamson's Woes.Neil Tennant - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):9-23.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Truth and the Enigma of Knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?David Efird - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once).Greg Restall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 339--354.
Tennant's Troubles.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--204.
Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157.Murali Ramachandran - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
Williamson's Woes.Neil Tennant - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):9-23.
Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

36 ( #141,220 of 2,158,394 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #194,528 of 2,158,394 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums