Intuitionistic mathematics does not needex falso quodlibet

Topoi 13 (2):127-133 (1994)
Abstract
We define a system IR of first-order intuitionistic relevant logic. We show that intuitionistic mathematics (on the assumption that it is consistent) can be relevantized, by virtue of the following metatheorem: any intuitionistic proof of A from a setX of premisses can be converted into a proof in IR of eitherA or absurdity from some subset ofX. Thus IR establishes the same inconsistencies and theorems as intuitionistic logic, and allows one to prove every intuitionistic consequence of any consistent set of premisses.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00763511
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,694
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Natural Logic.H. A. Lewis & Neil Tennant - 1981 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125):376.
Perfect Validity, Entailment and Paraconsistency.Neil Tennant - 1984 - Studia Logica 43 (1-2):181 - 200.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Cut for Core Logic.Neil Tennant - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (3):450-479.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
62 ( #87,711 of 2,197,196 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #298,376 of 2,197,196 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature