Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?

Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778 (2016)

Authors
Vincenzo Crupi
Università degli Studi di Torino
Abstract
Inductive reasoning requires exploiting links between evidence and hypotheses. This can be done focusing either on the posterior probability of the hypothesis when updated on the new evidence or on the impact of the new evidence on the credibility of the hypothesis. But are these two cognitive representations equally reliable? This study investigates this question by comparing probability and impact judgments on the same experimental materials. The results indicate that impact judgments are more consistent in time and more accurate than probability judgments. Impact judgments also predict the direction of errors in probability judgments. These findings suggest that human inductive reasoning relies more on estimating evidential impact than on posterior probability
Keywords Inference  Inductive reasoning  Impact  Probabilistic reasoning  Confirmation measures  Confirmation judgments
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DOI 10.1111/cogs.12259
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Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 2016 - Cambridge University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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