The judgment of a weak will

Abstract
In trying to explain the possibility of akrasia , it seems plausible to deny that there is a conceptual connection between motivation and evaluation ; akrasia occurs when the agent is motivated to do something that she does not judge to be good . However, it is hard to see how such accounts could respect our intuition that the akratic agent acts freely, or that there is a difference between akrasia and compulsion. It is also hard to see how such accounts could be extended to the realm of theoretical reason, but this is generally not taken Ito be a problem, because it is generally assumed that there is no similar phenomenon in the realm of theoretical reason. This paper argues that there is such a thing as theoretical akrasia, and that we can find a characterization of this phenomenon in Descartes’s Meditations. Drawing on certain passages in the Meditations, we can construct an account of theoretical akrasia; this account can then be adapted to resolve the original problem of akrasia in the realm of practical reason. The account asserts that there is a conceptual connection between motivation and evaluation in free action; it also enables us to show how the akratic agent is still acting freely when he does something that he does not judge to be the best all things considered.
Keywords theoretical akrasia  epistemic akrasia  akrasia
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2653561
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,813
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge.Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):219-241.
Knowing the Good and Knowing What One is Doing.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):91-117.
The Courage of Conviction.Sarah K. Paul - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):1-23.
How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):577-599.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action.Christine Tappolet - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 97--120.
Akratic Believers.Amelie Rorty - 1983 - American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183.
Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion.Jessica Moss - 2009 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):119-156.
Akrasia and Self-Control.David Wall - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):69 – 78.
Epistemic Akrasia.David Owens - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):381-397.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
319 ( #9,861 of 2,202,700 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #29,785 of 2,202,700 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature