Properties of Being in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Joshua Tepley
Saint Anselm College
While it is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different ‘kinds of being’ and identifies various ‘structures’ that compose them, there has been little discussion about what these kinds and structures of being are. This paper defends the ‘Property Thesis’, the position that kinds of being (and their structures) are properties of the entities that have them. I give two arguments for this thesis. The first is grounded in the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of being as ‘characteristics’ and ‘determinations’, which are just two different words for ‘properties’, in the broadest senses of these terms. The second argument is based on the fact that kinds and structures of being play three roles that properties are supposed to play: they are what account for similarities between things, they are what predicates express, and they are what abstract nouns refer to.
Keywords Heidegger  being  properties  ontology  metaphysics  analytic philosophy
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2014.913892
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References found in this work BETA

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Ways of Being.Kris McDaniel - 2009 - In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Heidegger and the ‘There Is’ of Being.Kris Mcdaniel - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):306-320.
Heidegger and Analytic Philosophy: Together at Last?Jon Robson - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):482-487.

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