Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):359-365 (1998)

Authors
Folke Tersman
Uppsala University
Abstract
Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, the appropriate conclusion is that the disagreement is not genuine, since we must otherwise attribute an inexplicable error
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00106
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ontological Relativity.W. V. Quine - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (7):185-212.
The Structure and Content of Truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
Coherence and Disagreement.Folke Tersman - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (3):305 - 317.

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From Scepticism to Anti‐Realism.Folke Tersman - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (3):411-427.

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