WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207 (2015)

Authors
Fabrice Teroni
University of Geneva
Abstract
We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature vs. nurture contrast applies to the emotions. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues.
Keywords emotion  intentionality  moral motivation  epistemology  moral judgement
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References found in this work BETA

What an Emotion Is: A Sketch.Robert C. Roberts - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.

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Citations of this work BETA

Camus’ Feeling of the Absurd.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 52 (4):477-490.

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