Emotion Review 9 (1):55-63 (2017)

Authors
Fabrice Teroni
University of Geneva
Abstract
We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action-readiness.
Keywords Emotion  Bodily Awareness  Emotion theory  Schachter and Singer  William James  Nico Frijda
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DOI 10.1177/1754073916639666
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References found in this work BETA

The Emotions.Nico H. Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Emotions and the Body. Testing the Subtraction Argument.Rodrigo Díaz - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):47-65.
The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2635-2663.
Do Emotions Cause Actions, and If So How?Andrea Scarantino - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (4):326-334.

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