Internalism, (Super)fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy

Philosophical Papers 32 (2):171-184 (2003)
Abstract David Sobel (2001) objects to Bernard Williams's internalism, the view that an agent has a reason to perform an action only if she has some motive that will be served by performing that action. Sobel is an unusual challenger in that he endorses neo-Humean subjectivism, ?the view that it is the agent's subjective motivational set that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to φ? (219). Sobel's objection in fact arises from this very commitment. Internalism, he says, is incompatible with the best subjectivist accounts of reasons for action?accounts that suggest that there are what he calls fragile reasons and perhaps also superfragile ones, both of which allegedly provide for counterexamples to internalism. I argue that such reasons do not in fact threaten internalism. I then briefly explore whether internalism is vulnerable to a related charge?that it commits the conditional fallacy
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/05568640309485121
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,422
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Peter Railton (1986). Facts and Values. Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ariela Tubert (2015). Sound Advice and Internal Reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):181-199.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Jason Wyckoff (2008). Reasons, Motivations, and Obligations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):451-468.
Kent Hurtig (2006). Internalism and Accidie. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):517 - 543.
Elinor Mason (2008). An Argument Against Motivational Internalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
Uriah Kriegel (2013). Justifying Desires. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):335-349.
Stephen Finlay (2006). The Reasons That Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
Joshua Gert (2002). Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):88-95.
H. Lillehammer (2000). The Doctrine of Internal Reasons. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):507-516.
R. Jay Wallace (1999). Three Conceptions of Rational Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

49 ( #99,339 of 1,924,770 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #308,315 of 1,924,770 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.