Hypatia 23 (3):pp. 205-216 (2008)

Lisa Tessman
State University of New York at Binghamton
Tessman responds to her three critics’ comments on Burdened Virtues, focusing on their concerns with her stipulation of an “inclusivity requirement,” according to which one cannot be said to flourish without contributing to the flourishing of an inclusive collectivity. Tessman identifies a naturalized approach to ethics—which she distinguishes from the naturalism she implicitly endorsed in Burdened Virtues—that illuminates how a conception of flourishing that meets the inclusivity requirement could carry moral authority.
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DOI 10.2979/HYP.2008.23.3.205
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References found in this work BETA

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.
Mind, Value, and Reality.John McDowell - 1998 - Harvard University Press.

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