The cost of consistency: information economy in Paraconsistent Belief Revision

South American Journal of Logic 1 (2):461-480 (2015)
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Abstract

By Belief Revision it is understood a system that logically explains the rational process of changing beliefs by taking into account a new piece of information. The most influential approach in this field of study, the AGM system, proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, postulates rationality criteria for different types of belief change. In this paper I shall assess the relationship between those criteria and argue for an opposition between the principles of Information Economy and Consistency. Furthermore, I shall argue that Paraconsistent Belief Revision manages to minimise this friction in the best possible way.

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Rafael Testa
University of Campinas

References found in this work

Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Theory contraction through base contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.
On the status of the postulate of recovery in the logic of theory change.David Makinson - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):383 - 394.

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