Brentano on the dual relation of the mental

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483 (2013)
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Abstract

Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind

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10.1007/s11097-012-9281-z

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Mark Textor
King's College London

Citations of this work

Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):79-98.
What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Michelle Montague - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 1785 - University Park, Pa.: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derek R. Brookes & Knud Haakonssen.
Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.

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