Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth

Mind 119 (475):615-655 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, and an object, namely a truth-value

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evidence, judgment and truth.Verena Mayer - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):175-197.
Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Frege’s Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
Frege's theory of Judgement.David Bell - 1979 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Frege's notions of self-evidence.Robin Jeshion - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):937-976.
Frege on truth, beauty and goodness.Simon Evnine - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):315-330.
A repair of Frege’s theory of thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
Did Frege really consider truth as an object?Dirk Greimann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
How tarskian is Frege?Joan Weiner - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):427-450.
Frege on truth, judgment, and objectivity.Erich H. Reck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-10-06

Downloads
197 (#97,395)

6 months
16 (#143,467)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Textor
King's College London

Citations of this work

Supposition: A Problem for Bilateralism.Nils Kürbis - 2023 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 53 (3):301-327.
The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic.Walter B. Pedriali - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8).
Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Frege and semantics.Richard G. Heck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.
Logic and Truth in Frege.Thomas Ricketts & James Levine - 1996 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):121 - 175.
Believing in things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
Frege's new science.G. Aldo Antonelli & Robert C. May - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):242-270.

View all 14 references / Add more references