Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth
Mind 119 (475):615-655 (2010)
| Abstract |
According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, and an object, namely a truth-value
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| Keywords | Frege Judgement Truth |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1093/mind/fzq041 |
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References found in this work BETA
Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
Citations of this work BETA
Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I.Daniele Mezzadri - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):583-591.
Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II.Daniele Mezzadri - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):592-600.
A New–Old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.
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The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege's Scientific Language. [REVIEW]D. Greimann - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
Un Examen de la Argumentación de Frege Contra la Definibilidad de la Verdad (an Examination of Frege's Argumentation Against the Definability of Truth).Moreno Luis Fernandez - 1996 - Theoria 11 (3):165-176.
Why Frege Thought It to Be "Probable" That Truth is Indefinable.Markus Stepanians - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):331-345.
Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner.Dirk Greimann - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):403-425.
Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity.Erich H. Reck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.
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