Mind 119 (475):615-655 (2010)
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| Abstract |
According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, and an object, namely a truth-value
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| Keywords | Frege Judgement Truth |
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| DOI | 10.1093/mind/fzq041 |
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References found in this work BETA
Frege's New Science.G. Aldo Antonelli & Robert C. May - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):242-270.
Believing in Things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic".William W. Taschek - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):375-401.
Logic and Truth in Frege.Thomas Ricketts & James Levine - 1996 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):121 - 175.
View all 13 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Birth of Semantics.Richard Kimberly Heck & Robert C. May - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (6):1-31.
Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
View all 14 citations / Add more citations
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