Mind 119 (475):615-655 (2010)

Authors
Mark Textor
King's College London
Abstract
According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, and an object, namely a truth-value
Keywords Frege  Judgement  Truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzq041
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,013
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Frege's New Science.G. Aldo Antonelli & Robert C. May - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (3):242-270.
Frege and Semantics.Richard Heck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.
Believing in Things.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):584–611.
Logic and Truth in Frege.Thomas Ricketts & James Levine - 1996 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):121 - 175.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Birth of Semantics.Richard Kimberly Heck & Robert C. May - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (6):1-31.
Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Tarski and Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Evidence, Judgment and Truth.Verena Mayer - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):175-197.
Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
Frege's Theory of Judgement.David Bell - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence.Robin Jeshion - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):937-976.
Frege on Truth, Beauty and Goodness.Simon Evnine - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):315-330.
A Repair of Frege’s Theory of Thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object?Dirk Greimann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
How Tarskian is Frege?Joan Weiner - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):427-450.
Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity.Erich H. Reck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-10-06

Total views
155 ( #57,796 of 2,344,158 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #71,504 of 2,344,158 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes