‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):226-240 (2021)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intractable. I will argue that Frege’s version of the content/force distinction is immune from these objections. In order to do so, I will reconstruct his argument that ‘the nature of a question’ requires a distinction between force and content. I will answer the concern about the unity of the proposition by outlining how the distinction can be combined with a Fregean account of the unity of thought.

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Mark Textor
King's College London

References found in this work

Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Der Gedanke.Gottlob Frege - 1918 - Beiträge Zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus 2:58-77.
Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.

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