Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82 (2009)

Mark Textor
King's College London
Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
Keywords Frege  Unsaturatedness
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00258.x
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Reference and Generality.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1225-1247.
Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.

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