Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's challenge, Frege's answer

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82 (2009)
Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
Keywords Frege  Unsaturatedness
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00258.x
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Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell.

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