Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Discovery

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:166 - 175 (1982)
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Abstract

Buchanan and Darden have provided compelling reasons why philosophers of science concerned with the nature of scientific discovery should be aware of current work in artificial intelligence. This paper contends that artificial intelligence is even more than a source of useful analogies for the philosophy of discovery: the two fields are linked by interfield connections between philosophy of science and cognitive psychology and between cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. Because the philosophy of discovery must pay attention to the psychology of practicing scientists, and because current cognitive psychology adopts a computational view of mind with AI providing the richest models of how the mind works, the philosophy of discovery must also concern itself with AI models of mental operations. The relevance of the artificial intelligence notion of a frame to the philosophy of discovery is briefly discussed.

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Paul Thagard
University of Waterloo

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Frames, knowledge, and inference.Paul R. Thagard - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):233 - 259.

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