Consciousness and Cognition

Oxford University Press (2002)
Michael Thau
University of Illinois at Springfield
This book maintains that our conception of consciousness and cognition begins with and depends upon a few fundamental errors. Thau elucidates these errors by discussing three important philosophical puzzles - Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White Mary - each of which concerns some aspect of either consciousness or cognition. He argues that it has gone unnoticed that each of these puzzles presents the very same problem and, in bringing this commonality to light, the errors in our natural conception of consciousness and cognition are also reviewed
Keywords Cognition  Consciousness  Metaphysics  Mind  Qualia  Self
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Call number BD418.3.T42 2002
ISBN(s) 0195141814   9780195141818  
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00410.x
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What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Representationalism About Consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.
Against Intentionalism.Bernhard Nickel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304.
Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.

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