Synthese 82 (2):255-74 (1990)

Authors
Paul Thagard
University of Waterloo
Abstract
This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive psychology are also important to epistemology and that there is more to conceptual change than mere belief revision. Understanding of epistemic change requires appreciation of the complex ways in which concepts are structured and organized and of how this organization can affect belief revision. Following a brief summary of the psychological functions of concepts and a discussion of some recent accounts of what concepts are, I propose a view of concepts as complex computational structures. This account suggests that conceptual change can come in varying degrees, with the most extreme consisting of fundamental conceptual reorganizations. These degrees of conceptual change are illustrated by the development of the concept of an acid
Keywords Belief  Cognitive Psychology  Concept  Epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413664
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conceptual Fragmentation and the Rise of Eliminativism.Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):17-40.
The Conceptual Structure of the Chemical Revolution.Paul Thagard - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):183-209.
Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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Conceptual Change.Paul Thagard - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.

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