From the descriptive to the normative in psychology and logic

Philosophy of Science 49 (1):24-42 (1982)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to describe a methodology for revising logical principles in the light of empirical psychological findings. Historical philosophy of science and wide reflective equilibrium in ethics are considered as providing possible models for arguing from the descriptive to the normative. Neither is adequate for the psychology/logic case, and a new model is constructed, employing criteria for evaluating inferential systems. Once we have such criteria, the notion of reflective equilibrium becomes redundant
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289032
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,727
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231.
Frames, Knowledge, and Inference.Paul Thagard - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):233 - 259.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
30 ( #176,952 of 2,197,345 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #148,981 of 2,197,345 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature