Philosophy of Science 50 (2):250-267 (1983)
Quine and others have recommended principles of charity which discourage judgments of irrationality. Such principles have been proposed to govern translation, psychology, and economics. After comparing principles of charity of different degrees of severity, we argue that the stronger principles are likely to block understanding of human behavior and impede progress toward improving it. We support a moderate principle of charity which leaves room for empirically justified judgments of irrationality
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Abstract Expressionism and the Communication Problem.David Liggins - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):599-620.
In Defence of Error Theory.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.
Parallel Computation and the Mind-Body Problem.Paul R. Thagard - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (3):301-18.
Similar books and articles
The Order of Charity in Thomas Aquinas.Susan C. Selner-Wright - 1995 - Philosophy and Theology 9 (1/2):13-27.
Theories of Rationality and Principles of Charity.Robert Wachbroit - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):35-47.
A Comparative Study of The Work of Charity in Christianity and Judaism.Frederick B. Bird - 1982 - Journal of Religious Ethics 10 (1):144 - 169.
The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity?Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
An Empirical Basis for Charity in Interpretation.David K. Henderson - 1990 - Erkenntnis 32 (1):83 - 103.
The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality).David K. Henderson - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):225 - 252.
Charity Implies Meta-Charity.Roy Sorensen - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):290 - 315.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #228,530 of 2,172,036 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #173,295 of 2,172,036 )
How can I increase my downloads?