Perception and action: On the praxial structure of intentional consciousness

Panos Theodorou
University of Crete
Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this approach as insufficient and misguided. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because consciousness, in all of its constituting syntheses, is or becomes organized as a practice-structure. Intentional consciousness organizes its contents according to rules so as to accomplish the evident or true givenness of its intended correlates
Keywords action  Husserl  intentionality  perceptual sense  praxis
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9019-x
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Phänomenologische Psychologie.Edmund Husserl - 1962 - Felix Meiner Verlag.
Erste Philosophie.Edmund Husserl & Rudolf Boehm - 1956 - Martiuns Nijhoff.

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