A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology

Economics and Philosophy 38 (3):395-415 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexicality, problems of the same kind remain.

Similar books and articles

Totalism Without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich & Ketan Ramakrishnan (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-231.
Does the Repugnant Conclusion Have Important Implications for Axiology or for Public Policy?Mark Budolfson & Dean Spears - 2022 - In Gustaf Arrhenius (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. pp. 350–C15.P105.
The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2011 - In Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov & Lacey Perry (eds.), Descriptive and Normative Approaches to Human Behavior. World Scientific Publishing Company. pp. 1–26.
One More Axiological Impossibility Theorem.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2009 - In Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz. Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Uppsala: Uppsala Philosophical Studies. pp. 23-37.
Incommensurability in Population Ethics.Jacob Nebel - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Oxford


Added to PP

263 (#44,696)

6 months
85 (#8,910)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elliott Thornley
Oxford University