Lucas Thorpe
Bogazici University
Event concepts are unstructured atomic concepts that apply to event types. I provide arguments for the existence of such concepts and offer an account of the role they play in the guidance of skilled action and the formation of what I call when-beliefs and where-beliefs. The account I offer allows us to explain how organisms that do not possess linguistic capacities are able to form seemıngly complex beliefs about the world. I argue that many of our beliefs may not be essentially linguistically structured, including seemingly complex beliefs such as the belief that Olga played chess in the kitchen yesterday. Instead such beliefs can be explained in terms of creating a link between an atomic event concept and positions on cognitive maps. Such beliefs should not be thought of as propositional attitudes.
Keywords mental file  perception  memory  cognitive maps  Belief  animal cognition  Millikan
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs.Dan Sperber - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.
Perception and Empirical Thought.Cheryl Ann Chen - 2002 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
The Epistemology of Genealogies.Justin P. McBrayer - 2018 - In Hans van Eyghen, Rik Peels & Gijsbert van den Brink (eds.), New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion - the Rationality of Religious Belief. Springer. pp. 157-169.
Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
Perception and Animal Belief.L. S. Carrier - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (212):193 - 209.
How Beliefs Make A Difference.Susan G. Sterrett - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Belief and Perception: A Unified Account.Michael Alan Thau - 1998 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts.Albert Newen & Andreas Bartels - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):283 – 308.
Perception and Belief.A. D. Smith - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.
Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs.Matthew Frise - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):63-79.
Occurrent Belief.Michael John Bello - 1980 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago


Added to PP index

Total views
98 ( #109,481 of 2,448,108 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #38,347 of 2,448,108 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes