Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):278 - 310 (2012)

Abstract
In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal reasoning tasks: the Argument Evaluation Task (AET) and a Law of Large Numbers (LLN) task in order to test the similarity of the phenomena concerned. Our findings provide little support for the idea that belief bias on formal and informal reasoning is a unitary phenomenon. First, there was no correlation across individuals in the extent of belief bias shown on the three tasks. Second, evidence for belief by strength interaction was observed only on AET and under conditions not required for the comparable finding on syllogistic reasoning. Finally, we found that while conclusion believability strongly influenced assessments of arguments strength, it had a relatively weak influence on the verbal justifications offered on the two informal reasoning tasks
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13546783.2012.670752
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,348
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.David E. Over - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Critical Thinking.Sven Ove Hansson - 2019 - Theoria 85 (1):3-7.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Enhancing Expertise in Informal Reasoning.Tim van Gelder - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 58:142--152.
The Cognitive Processes in Informal Reasoning.Victoria F. Shaw - 1996 - Thinking and Reasoning 2 (1):51 – 80.
Informal Logic.Leo Groarke - 1996 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Inhibiting Beliefs Demands Attention.Kevin Barton, Jonathan Fugelsang & Daniel Smilek - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (3):250 – 267.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-06-13

Total views
44 ( #231,589 of 2,419,997 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #542,808 of 2,419,997 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes