Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker
Judith Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.)
Oxford University Press (2006)
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| Abstract |
Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honor of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed.
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| Keywords | Modality (Logic Logic Language and languages Philosophy |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Buy the book | $112.50 direct from Amazon (10% off) Amazon page |
| Call number | BC199.M6.C65 2006 |
| ISBN(s) | 0199282803 9780199282807 |
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Understanding Assertion.Scott Soames - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press. pp. 222--250.
The Story of 'Fred'.Frank Jackson - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Review: Judith Thomson and Alex Byrne (Eds): Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. [REVIEW]T. Yagisawa - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):532-537.
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Stalnaker on the Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.
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