Authors
B. Thompson
Concordia University
Brad Thompson
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content of colour experience and do justice to its phenomenology.
Keywords Color  Constancy  Epistemology  Phenomenology  Representationalism  Russell, Bertrand
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DOI 10.1080/00048400600571752
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Husserl on Perceptual Constancy.Michael Madary - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.

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