Philosophy Compass 10 (4):255-263 (2015)

Authors
Emily Thomas
Durham University
Abstract
The early modern Catharine Cockburn wrote on a wide range of philosophical issues and recent years have seen an increasing interest in her work. This paper explores her thesis that immaterial substance need not think. Drawing on existing scholarship, I explore the origin of this thesis in Cockburn and show how she applies it in a novel way to space. This thesis provides a particularly useful entry point into Cockburn's philosophy, as it emphasises the importance of her metaphysics and connects with many of her further philosophical views. This paper shows that it is rewarding to consider Cockburn's philosophical views as a holistic system
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12210
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.

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Catharine Trotter Cockburn.Patricia Sheridan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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