Disembodied Animals

American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):203-217 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper defends a hylomorphic version of animalism according to which human persons survive as immaterial, bodiless animals after death. According to the hylomorphism under consideration, human persons have souls that survive death, and according to the animalism under consideration, human persons are necessarily animals. One might think this implies that human persons don't survive their deaths since if they were to survive their deaths, they would be immaterial animals after death, but necessarily animals are material. This paper shows that the hylomorphic animalist can overcome this problem in a way that respects the intuition that animals are material. In addition, the paper defends the hylomorphic animalist survivalist from the objection that her view introduces an insoluble mereological puzzle.

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Citations of this work

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Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
Real Essentialism.David S. Oderberg - 2007 - New York: Routledge.
.Eleonore Stump (ed.) - 1993 - Cornell Univ Pr.

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