Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278 (2006)
AbstractIn 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental ethical theory.
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In Defence of Bad Science and Irrational Policies: an Alternative Account of the Precautionary Principle.Stephen John - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):3-18.