Princeton University Press (2003)

Judith Jarvis Thomson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Martha Nussbaum
University of Chicago
In my contribution to this volume, I (BHS) comment on on the stultifying rhetoric of contemporary analytic moral theory as illustrated in Judith Jarvis Thomson's Tanner Lectures, with particular reference to Thomson's anxieties about the moral relativism exhibited by college freshman and to her efforts--quite strained, in my view, and inevitably unsuccessful--to demonstrate the existence of objective judgments in matters of morality and taste .
Keywords moral theory  relativism  analytic philosophy  ordinary language  judgment  taste  ethics  objectivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book $11.98 used (71% off)   $29.00 new (29% off)   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780691114736   9780691086736   0691086737   0691114730
DOI 10.1093/mind/113.452.787
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,587
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
In Defence of Repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.
The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
Things That Make Things Reasonable.John Gibbons - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.
Skepticism About Character Traits.Gilbert Harman - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):235 - 242.

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
50 ( #217,776 of 2,461,958 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #178,501 of 2,461,958 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes