Princeton University Press (2009)
Abstract |
How should we live? What do we owe to other people? In Goodness and Advice, the eminent philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson explores how we should go about answering such fundamental questions. In doing so, she makes major advances in moral philosophy, pointing to some deep problems for influential moral theories and describing the structure of a new and much more promising theory. Thomson begins by lamenting the prevalence of the idea that there is an unbridgeable gap between fact and value--that to say something is good, for example, is not to state a fact, but to do something more like expressing an attitude or feeling. She sets out to challenge this view, first by assessing the apparently powerful claims of Consequentialism. Thomson makes the striking argument that this familiar theory must ultimately fail because its basic requirement--that people should act to bring about the "most good"--is meaningless. It rests on an incoherent conception of goodness, and supplies, not mistaken advice, but no advice at all. Thomson then outlines the theory that she thinks we should opt for instead. This theory says that no acts are, simply, good: an act can at most be good in one or another way--as, for example, good for Smith or for Jones. What we ought to do is, most importantly, to avoid injustice; and whether an act is unjust is a function both of the rights of those affected, including the agent, and of how good or bad the act is for them. The book, which originated in the Tanner lectures that Thomson delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 1999, includes two chapters by Thomson ("Goodness" and "Advice"), provocative comments by four prominent scholars--Martha Nussbaum, Jerome Schneewind, Philip Fisher, and Barbara Herrnstein Smith--and replies by Thomson to those comments.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Buy this book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
ISBN(s) | 9781400824724 1400824729 |
DOI | 10.1515/9781400824724 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options

References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Perception and Conceptual Content.Alex Byrne - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
Aesthetic Reasons and the Demands They (Do Not) Make.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):407-427.
View all 31 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice, Edited by Amy Gutmann:Goodness and Advice.Michael Ridge - 2003 - Ethics 113 (2):447-450.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), XVI + 188 Pp. [REVIEW]Michael J. Zimmerman - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):534–552.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, Pp. Xvi + 187.Alec Walen - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (2):253.
Goodness and Advice.Judith Jarvis Thomson, Philip Fisher, Martha C. Nussbaum, J. B. Schneewind & Barbara Herrnstein Smith - 2003 - Princeton University Press.
Some Advice for Moral Psychologists.Eric Wiland - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):299–310.
Publishing Advice for Graduate Students.Thom Brooks - 2008 - Social Science Research Network 1:1-31.
Monadic Teleology Without Goodness and Without God.Julia Jorati - 2013 - The Leibniz Review 23:43-72.
Absolute Goodness: In Defence of the Useless and Immoral.Michael Campbell - 2015 - Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):95-112.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-01-20
Total views
33 ( #345,404 of 2,505,153 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,004 of 2,505,153 )
2015-01-20
Total views
33 ( #345,404 of 2,505,153 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,004 of 2,505,153 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads