Philosophical Investigations 20 (2):136–151 (1997)

Authors
Tim Thornton
University of Central Lancashire
Abstract
I believe that Wright’s constructivist account of intention is funda- mentally flawed [Wright 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992]. To understand why it fails it is necessary first to locate the account in its broader strategic context. That context is Wright’s response to Wittgenstein’s account of rule following. When so located the diagnosis of the account’s failure is clear. Wright’s account of intention is a species of the interpretative approach to mental content which is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9205.00035
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