Synthese 160 (2):203-213 (2008)

Authors
Brad Thompson
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of (...) Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties
Keywords Inverted spectrum  Representationalism  Phenomenal content  Color  Perception
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9110-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mental Imagery and Fiction.Dustin Stokes - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):731-754.
Senses for Senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.
Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Colour Constancy and Fregean Representationalism.Boyd Millar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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