Topoi 28 (1):23-30 (2009)

Authors
Mog Stapleton
University of Edinburgh
Evan Thompson
University of British Columbia
Abstract
This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
Keywords Enaction  Extended mind  Autonomy  Sense-making  Emotion  Embodiment  Incorporation
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2
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References found in this work BETA

Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive Approach to Social Cognition.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.

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Citations of this work BETA

Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris D. Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Emotions Beyond Brain and Body.Achim Stephan, Sven Walter & Wendy Wilutzky - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-17.

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