Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories

Topoi 28 (1):23-30 (2009)
Abstract
This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
Keywords Enaction  Extended mind  Autonomy  Sense-making  Emotion  Embodiment  Incorporation
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2
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References found in this work BETA
Participatory Sense-Making.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.

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Citations of this work BETA
Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Emotions Beyond Brain and Body.Achim Stephan, Sven Walter & Wendy Wilutzky - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-17.

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