Oup Usa (2014)

Amie Thomasson
Dartmouth College
Amie Thomasson
Dartmouth College
Existence questions have been topics for heated debates in metaphysics, but this book argues that they can often be answered easily, by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises. This 'easy' approach to ontology leads to realism about disputed entities, and to the view that metaphysical disputes about existence questions are misguided.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014, 2015, 2018
Buy this book $18.14 new   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780199385119   9780190878665   0190878665   0199385114
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library


Fictionalism versus Deflationism

The easy approach and fictionalism both present alternatives to the traditional options of eliminativism and heavyweight realism, and both lead to the conclusion that something is wrong with serious ontological debates. But the easy ontologist accepts the disputed entities, while the ficti... see more

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should It Be?David Chalmers - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Realism and Social Structure.Elizabeth Barnes - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2417-2433.
The Ontology of Social Groups.Amie Thomasson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4829-4845.
Realism and the Absence of Value.Shamik Dasgupta - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):279-322.

View all 159 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
148 ( #81,342 of 2,533,634 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #64,390 of 2,533,634 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes