On the preference for more specific reference classes
Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051 (2017)
Abstract
In attempting to form rational personal probabilities by direct inference, it is usually assumed that one should prefer frequency information concerning more specific reference classes. While the preceding assumption is intuitively plausible, little energy has been expended in explaining why it should be accepted. In the present article, I address this omission by showing that, among the principled policies that may be used in setting one’s personal probabilities, the policy of making direct inferences with a preference for frequency information for more specific reference classes yields personal probabilities whose accuracy is optimal, according to all proper scoring rules, in situations where all of the relevant frequency information is point-valued. Assuming that frequency information for narrower reference classes is preferred, when the relevant frequency statements are point-valued, a dilemma arises when choosing whether to make a direct inference based upon relatively precise-valued frequency information for a broad reference class, R, or upon relatively imprecise-valued frequency information for a more specific reference class, R*. I address such cases, by showing that it is often possible to make a precise-valued frequency judgment regarding R* based on precise-valued frequency information for R, using standard principles of direct inference. Having made such a frequency judgment, the dilemma of choosing between and is removed, and one may proceed by using the precise-valued frequency estimate for the more specific reference class as a premise for direct inference.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11229-016-1035-y
My notes
Similar books and articles
Undercutting defeat via reference properties of differing arity: a reply to Pust.Paul D. Thorn - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):662-667.
Law, Statistics, and the Reference Class Problem.Edward K. Cheng - 2009 - Columbia Law Review, Sidebar 109.
Probabilities in decision rules.Paul Weirich - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 289--319.
Probability and Direct Reference: Three Puzzles of Probability Theory: The Problem of the Two Boys, Freund's Problem and the Problem of the Three Prisoners.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):51 - 78.
The Simulation Argument and the Reference Class Problem: the dialectical contextualist's standpoint.Paul Franceschi - unknown
Public Proper Names, Idiolectal Identifying Descriptions.Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):317-326.
Troubles with Direct Reference.Pierre Baumann - 2012 - Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 93:33-51.
An inconsistency in direct reference theory.George Bealer - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
Analytics
Added to PP
2016-02-09
Downloads
318 (#37,478)
6 months
47 (#28,926)
2016-02-09
Downloads
318 (#37,478)
6 months
47 (#28,926)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.
How Category Selection Impacts Inference Reliability: Inheritance Inference From an Ecological Perspective.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (4):e12971.
A Formal Solution to Reichenbach's Reference Class Problem.Paul D. Thorn - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (3):349-366.
An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.
An Argument for the Principle of Indifference and Against the Wide Interval View.John E. Wilcox - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):65-87.
References found in this work
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry Into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.