Risk aversion and the long run

Ethics 129 (2):230-253 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the face of risk. I argue that this poses a challenge to alternatives to expected utility theory more generally.

Similar books and articles

Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Revisiting Risk and Rationality: A Reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.
Risk and Tradeoffs.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.
On the Definition of Risk Aversion.Aldo Montesano - 1990 - Theory and Decision 29 (1):53-68.
On Risk and Rationality.Brad Armendt - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1-9.
Economic Choice in Generalized Expected Utility Theory.John Quiggin - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):153-171.
Risk Writ Large.Johanna Thoma & Jonathan Weisberg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2369-2384.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-06-15

Downloads
731 (#11,264)

6 months
81 (#9,570)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Johanna Thoma
London School of Economics

References found in this work

Diachronic Rationality.Patrick Maher - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
Revisiting Risk and Rationality: A Reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.

Add more references