Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):580–609 (2003)
It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind-independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind-dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the everyday world. In closing I consider some wider consequences of these results for social science and philosophy.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Ruth G. Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice.Ruth G. Millikan - 1993 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Two Conceptions of Technical Malfunction.Bjørn Jespersen & Massimiliano Carrara - 2011 - Theoria 77 (2):117-138.
Programming Languages as Technical Artifacts.Raymond Turner - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (3):377-397.
Three Kinds of Social Kinds.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):96-112.
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