Synthese 160 (3):203--213 (2008)

Authors
Evan Thompson
University of British Columbia
Abstract
This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience
Keywords Mental imagery  Consciousness  Representation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9086-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,826
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

View all 51 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mental Imagery and Fiction.Dustin Stokes - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):731-754.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
513 ( #13,750 of 2,438,839 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #208,950 of 2,438,839 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes