Shoemaker on phenomenal content

Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334 (2007)
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Abstract

In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content. It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum - inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience

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Brad Thompson
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.
Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
On sense and intension.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82.

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