Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):351-355 (2009)

Authors
Thomas Nadelhoffer
College of Charleston
Abstract
In this paper, we examine Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely’s recent claim that “the personality trait extraversion predicts people’s intuitions about the relationship of determinism to free will and moral responsibility”. We will first present some criticisms of their work before briefly examining the results of a recent study of our own. We argue that while Feltz and Cokely have their finger on the pulse of an interesting and important issue, they have not established a robust and stable connection between extraversion and compatibilist-friendly intuitions.
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2008.11.006
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References found in this work BETA

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

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The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
Fringe Benefits, Side Effects, and Indifference: A Reply to Feltz.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):127-136.

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