Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):159-175 (2008)
One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions.
|Keywords||Philosophy of psychiatry Wittgenstein On Certainty Eilan Campbell Maher Frith|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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On Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):105-129.
Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
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