Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions

Authors
Tim Thornton
University of Central Lancashire
Abstract
One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions.
Keywords Philosophy of psychiatry  Wittgenstein  On Certainty  Eilan  Campbell  Maher  Frith
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-007-9079-6
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):105-129.
Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
Abnormal Certainty: Examining the Epistemological Status of Delusional Beliefs.Svetlana Bardina - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):546-560.

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