Philosophical Studies 167 (3):683-699 (2014)

Authors
John Thrasher
Chapman University
Abstract
For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal of bargaining theories of justice
Keywords David Gauthier  John Nash  John Harsanyi  Thomas Schelling  Bargaining  Symmetry
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0121-y
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self-Organizing Moral Systems: Beyond Social Contract Theory.Gerald Gaus - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):119-147.

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