Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):596–602 (2006)

Joshua C. Thurow
University of Texas at San Antonio
In his recent book Albert Casullo rejects the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non-experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. This claim is a crucial premise in a simple argument for the experiential defeasibility of a priori justification. I defend the premise against Casullo's objection, the main problem with which is that he does not take into account the evidential role of multiple corroborating sources of testimony. I conclude that the crucial premise is true and that the simple argument is sound; thus many of our a priori justified beliefs are experientially defeasible
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.461.x
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References found in this work BETA

A Theory of the a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:29-55.
A Priori Knowledge for Fallibilists.Aron Edidin - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (2):189 - 197.

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Citations of this work BETA

The a Priority of Abduction.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):735-758.
Defeasible a Priori Justification: A Reply to Thurow.Albert Casullo - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):336–343.

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