A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism

Synthese 191 (16):3919-3934 (2014)

Authors
Justin Tiehen
University of Puget Sound
Abstract
In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the “Two Visual Systems Hypothesis” notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner
Keywords Nonconceptual content  Concepts  Functionalism   Two visual systems hypothesis  Holism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0505-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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