Disproportional mental causation

Synthese 182 (3):375-391 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation which reject the idea of causal competition, and which thus are able to allow for disproportional mental causation. This, I argue, is a significant advantage for such noncompetitive accounts.
Keywords Mental causation  Nonreductive physicalism  Proportionality  Yablo
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9749-8
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References found in this work BETA
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
How to Define Theoretical Terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.

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