Res Publica 20 (2):163-181 (2014)

Authors
Christine Tiefensee
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Abstract
Metaethics is traditionally understood as a non-moral discipline that examines moral judgements from a standpoint outside of ethics. This orthodox understanding has recently come under pressure from anti-Archimedeans, such as Ronald Dworkin and Matthew Kramer, who proclaim that rather than assessing morality from an external perspective, metaethical theses are themselves substantive moral claims. In this paper, I scrutinise this anti-Archimedean challenge as applied to the metaethical position of expressivism. More precisely, I examine the claim that expressivists do not avoid moral commitments when accounting for moral thought, but instead presuppose them; they do not look at ethics from the outside, but operate from within ethics. This paper defends the non-moral status of expressivism against anti-Archimedeanism by rejecting a new anti-Archimedean challenge which, on the basis of Hume’s Law, aims to exploit expressivist explanations of supervenience in order to show that expressivism is a substantive moral position.
Keywords Expressivism  Minimalism  Anti-Archimedeanism  Supervenience  Metaethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11158-014-9239-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Justice for Hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
Expressivism, Subjectivism and Moral Disagreement.Sebastian Köhler - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):71-78.
Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Archimedean Metaethics Defended.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):508-529.
The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387.
Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
The Problem of Ethical Vagueness for Expressivism.Nicholas Baima - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):593-605.
Elaborating Expressivism: Moral Judgments, Desires and Motivation.John Eriksson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.
Options for Hybrid Expressivism.Caj Strandberg - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
Expressivism and the Value of Truth.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-02-27

Total views
181 ( #59,201 of 2,454,703 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #44,680 of 2,454,703 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes