Explaining causal closure

Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425 (2015)
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Abstract

The physical realm is causally closed, according to physicalists like me. But why is it causally closed, what metaphysically explains causal closure? I argue that reductive physicalists are committed to one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of any independent explanation, and that as a result, they must give up on using a causal argument to attack mind–body dualism. Reductive physicalists should view dualism in much the way that we view the hypothesis that unicorns exist, or that the Kansas City Royals won the 2003 World Series: false, but not objectionable in any distinctively causal way. My argument turns on connections between explanation, counterfactuals, and inductive confirmation

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Citations of this work

Metaphysical grounding.Ricki Bliss & Kelly Trogdon - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.
A causal argument for dualism.Bradford Saad - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2475-2506.
Causal closure of the physical, mental causation, and physics.Dejan R. Dimitrijević - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-22.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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