In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 16. Oxford: (forthcoming)

Authors
Christine Tiefensee
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Abstract
In this paper, I develop a metasemantics for relaxed moral realism. More precisely, I argue that relaxed realists should be inferentialists about meaning and explain that the role of evaluative moral vocabulary is to organise and structure language exit transitions, much as the role of theoretical vocabulary is to organise and structure language entry transitions.
Keywords Metasemantics  Relaxed normative realism  Quietism  Inferentialism
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.

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Citations of this work BETA

Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse.Pekka Väyrynen - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):107-121.

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