On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom

Sophia 40 (2):1-6 (2001)

Abstract
Those who advance the traditional argument from human freedom presume that human freedom provides an adequate explanation of moral evil. I argue that this presumption is erroneous. An adequate explanation of our capacity to make choices that produce moral evil must be distinguished from an adequate explanation of the actuality of such choices. Human freedom may account for our ability to make choices that issue in moral evil. It cannot, by itself, account for our actually making such choices. Something more than our potential for choices that produce moral evil is required to adequately explain the profusion of moral evil that we actually find in the world.
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DOI 10.1007/BF02782382
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